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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from the final judgment of the Honorable Tyrone Medley,
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I:

The trial court misinterpreted and misapplied binding Utah

precedent and black letter defamation law in granting defendants' directed verdict
request. The trial court erroneously directed the verdict for the defendants
regarding the claims for defamation and intentional interference with economic
relations pertaining to the Utah Medical Insurance Association ("UMIA") because
it applied a subjective standard based on Alaska law, rather than the applicable
Utah precedent, which required an objective standard when determining that the
defendants did not abuse their claimed conditional privilege. (R. at 864-350).
In Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991), this Court
explained:
On appeal, the standard we use to review a directed verdict granted
at the close of evidence is whether reasonable minds would agree
that no substantial evidence supported each element of a cause of
action. Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n
v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). To that
end, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party. If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence that would
support a verdict in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict
cannot stand. Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d at 898. But a directed
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verdict is appropriate if, on uncontested facts and under the
applicable law, one party is entitled to judgment.
In addition to misapplying the law, the trial court erred in directing the
verdict in this case because contested facts existed:

"Whether a statement is

entitled to the protection of a conditional privilege presents a question of law;
whether the holder of the privilege lost it due to abuse presents a question of fact."
O'Connor v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, If 38, 165 P.3d 1214, 1224 (citing
Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, ^j 53, 116 P.3d 271;
Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58; Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 Utah 407, 228
P.2d 272, 274-75(1951)).
Issue II:

The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion for

summary judgment on Plaintiffs

claim for intentional interference with

prospective economic relations regarding Siegfried & Jensen.
The trial court should have denied defendants' motion for summary
judgment. "In reviewing the [trial] court's grant of summary judgment, we review
the court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and review the
facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Young v. Wardley Corp., 2008 UT App 104, <h 7, 182 P.3d 412, 414
(quoting Brockbank v. Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251, ^ 10, 32 P.3d 990 (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County,
2003 UT 28, ^ 4, 73 P.3d 362 ("We review the district court's summary judgment
ruling for correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions.").
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Issue III:

The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion for

summary judgment on plaintiffs claims against defendant Frankenburg. The trial
court should have denied summary judgment on the claims against defendant
Frankenburg because disputed issues of material fact existed.
"In reviewing the [trial] court's grant of summary judgment, we review the
court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and review the facts
and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
Young, 2008 UT App 104, ^ 7, 182 P.3d at 414.
Issue IV: The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion in limine
precluding Plaintiff from offering any evidence of the fact that members of the
firm consumed alcohol in the office, of any alleged affair between firm employees,
of Plaintiffs surgical procedure scheduled for May 6, 2005, and of Plaintiffs
brother's suicide. Plaintiff needed this evidence to meet his burden of proof to
show defendants abused the conditional privilege.
The trial court should have denied defendants' motion in limine and
allowed the evidence to show motive and malice. This Court reviews the trial
court's legal conclusions in a motion in limine for correctness. Ford v. Am.
Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, «[[ 33, 98 P.3d 15, 24.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial court entered the final judgment in this matter on February 26,
2008, which entered no cause of action Judgment and the judge's Order also dated
February 26, 2008, which granted defendants' motion for directed verdict on the
3

Plaintiffs claims of defamation and intentional interference with economic
relations, (R. at 836-839), as well as the Order dated February 26, 2008, which
granted defendants' motion in limine and the grants of summary judgment on
defendants' motion for reconsideration of the Court's order regarding Plaintiffs
claim for wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
intentional interference with prospective economic relations regarding Siegfried &
Jensen and all claims against defendant Frankenburg. (R. at 840-843). Appellant
filed his notice of appeal on March 21, 2008. (R. at 844-846).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 5, 2005, defendants wrongfully terminated Plaintiff/Appellant
Gary B. Ferguson ("Ferguson") from his employment with Williams & Hunt, Inc.
("the law firm"), where he had been employed as an attorney since 1991, and he
was one of the founding partners/shareholders. (R. at 863-61; 864-180 to -181).
Ferguson was a medical malpractice defense lawyer who had built virtually his
entire professional practice around one client — UMIA — during his employment
at the law firm; UMIA was also the law firm's largest client.
Before his termination, Ferguson had a solid working relationship with
UMIA, and UMIA sent him direct referrals for legal work.

(R. at 864-278).

However, defendants knowingly, in reckless disregard for the truth, and with
malice defamed Ferguson to representatives of UMIA by falsely informing them
that he had been over-billing for his time. The law firm did this in order to avoid
Ferguson being allowed by UMIA to take the medical malpractice files that he
4

was currently handling at the time of his termination to another firm and continue
handling the medical malpractice defense on those cases. Defendants intended
their false communication to UMIA to harm Ferguson and prevent him from
getting any future cases from UMIA after the law firm terminated him. (R. at 185,
Ex. A at 28-29, 71-72). Defendants refused to take the "over-billing" concerns to
UMIA before terminating Ferguson because they knew that would yield a result
contrary to their plan to defame Ferguson and destroy his ability to compete for
UMIA's business — when approached after the fact, UMIA found no over-billing
and had no complaints. (R. at 185, Ex. I; 864-290). Defendants could have
terminated Ferguson for any reason; however they defamed him in a calculated
manner in order to eliminate a competitor and endeavored to kill Ferguson's career
as a medical malpractice attorney.
Ferguson was terminated for his unwillingness to participate in the law firm
drinking ritual. (R. at 185, Ex. A at ^f 8-11, 16). The claim of over-billing was
merely a retaliatory act on the part of the defendants to what they perceived as a
slight against them by Ferguson and was used as a tool to ensure that all of the
partners would vote to remove Ferguson as a partner in the firm. The defendants
knew at the time that the computer log sheet was not a sufficient basis to claim
that an attorney had over-billed; they merely used this claim out of ill will and
malice toward Ferguson, which is evident in the firm meeting where the overbilling was discussed only as one of the several reasons for the "reasons we want
him out" (R. at 185, Ex. J).
5

Defendants fired Ferguson the day before surgery to remove a suspected
cancerous thyroid. (R. at 7, f 40). The defendants knew that Ferguson's disability
policy would terminate the day he was fired. The defendants knew that one of the
recognized complications of a thyroidectomy was loss of the ability to speak.
Defendants knew that Ferguson could end up unemployable as a trial lawyer as a
result of the surgery, and if terminated, he would have no disability insurance.
This action, as much as anything, proves malice on defendants' part. (R. at 185,
Ex. Cat ffi[ 16, 20, 24).
Defendants terminated and defamed Ferguson because he attempted to have
them obey the laws against sexual harassment with respect to male attorneys
having sexual relationships with subordinates. (R. at 185, Ex. C, 'jj 18).
Defendants terminated and defamed Ferguson knowing that part of the
reason he worked so many hours in a compressed time was because he was taking
a portion of the month of May 2005 off of work for family celebrations: his son
graduating from medical school and his daughter doing her dissertation for her
Ph.D. during the same time period. (R. at 185, Ex. C at ffi[41, 42; 864-107 to 109, -229 to -230). And, defendants Hunt and Williams knew Ferguson's brother,
Christopher Ferguson, committed suicide after being terminated from his position
as a nurse anesthetist. (R. at 185, Ex. C at f 26).
Defendants defamed Ferguson due to what they perceived as a slight
against them by Mr. Ferguson and was used as a tool to ensure that all of the
partners would vote to remove Ferguson as a partner in the firm. The defendants
6

knew at the time that the computer log sheet was not a sufficient basis to claim
that an attorney had over-billed. They merely used this claim out of ill will and
malice toward the Ferguson, which is evident in the firm meeting where the overbilling was discussed only as one of the several reasons for the "reasons we want
him out." (R. at 185, Ex. E at 89-96; Ex. J). Even at the time after the supposed
investigation had taken place by the law firm, Williams, who had performed the
investigation, was unable to point to any specific case where Ferguson had overbilled. (R. at 185, Ex. E at 98-101; 864-158).
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the privilege to
communicate a matter to another that concerns the reasons for an employee's
discharge. (R. at 864-150 to -151). That privilege is not absolute, it is conditional
or qualified, and the principal factual dispute in this case should have prevented
the directed verdict in this case, and contrary to defendants' representations at trial
for the need of "mountains of evidence" contrary to the defamatory statement (R.
at 864-336, -345), defendants knew that they had no credible evidence that
Ferguson had over-billed UMIA.
There is no policy in place, nor is it common practice in the legal
community, to limit the time an attorney bills a client to the time the attorney
spends using the office computer; however, the "proof submitted by the law firm
to UMIA for Ferguson's "over-billing" came from defendants investigating the
times Ferguson logged in and out of the law firm's computer server, and
determining that only time spent logged on to the firm's server was considered
7

time Ferguson was working. (R. at 185, Ex. E at 37-38; 864-169 to -170, -234).
And, this investigation only comprised Ferguson's desktop computer, not his
laptop, which defendants never produced information about in discovery. (R. at
864-242). Defendant Williams testified that he did not have the information to
draw the over-billing conclusions when presented with particular billing entry
examples. (R. at 864-206 to -207). He even agreed that accusing Ferguson of
over-billing without having investigated any of those entries would be
unreasonable, but that he did not do so. (R. at 864-207). Williams further testified
that the law firm was "unable to determine which specific entries — typically
were unable to determine which specific entries reflected bills for work he
[Ferguson] did not do." (R. at 864-224 to -225).
As Mr. Oslowski testified at his deposition:
Well, he [Williams] advised me that as his duty as general counsel
for UMIA, that he had a duty to disclose that Gary's billing practices
had come under question. He indicated that they decided to keep
track of when he was logging on and off his computer, and that
within the first couple of days of doing that, that I think Gary had
some kind of medical problem he had to take care of or had a
medical appointment and came in about midday and left around five
o'clock and billed UMIA for approximately 11 hours of work that
day.
(R. at 185, Ex. G at 9-10). The log in/log out monitoring had never been used to
track billable time for any other attorney at the law firm, (R. at 185, Ex. E at 38),
in fact defendant Williams had no familiarity regarding computer log in/log out
times before the law firm began investigating Ferguson. (R. at 864-191). Medical
malpractice attorneys spend a good deal of their billable time away from the office
8

taking depositions, researching case law, doing medical research, meeting with
clients, meeting with expert witnesses and doctors after hours. (R. at 864-142).
This was Ferguson's method of legal practice, and was also the practice of the
other trial lawyers at the law firm, including defendant Williams.
Before the law firm terminated Ferguson, defendant Williams contacted
Martin Oslowski of UMIA and told him that he had a trust issue with Ferguson's
billings, and informed him the law firm planned to fire Ferguson. (R. at 185, Ex.
H at 31). Williams told Oslowski "we had formed the belief, after reviewing
information we'd collected, that we could not trust the accuracy of [Ferguson's]
bills." (R. at 864-233). He said: "It appeared to us that he was billing more than
he actually worked." (R. at 864-233). Williams told Oslowski that the law firm
was terminating Ferguson because he had over-billed UMIA, (R. at 185, Ex. G at
20; 864-233). Based on this communication, the law firm sent a false message to
UMIA and Oslowski that UMIA could not trust Ferguson to tell the truth about the
time he had spent on UMIA cases, and that UMIA had been over-billed for
Ferguson's work, according to defendant Williams, and "that was the reason for
termination." (R. at 185, Ex. G at 25; 864-258 to -259).
Oslowski testified that he trusted the attorneys who handled medical
malpractice defense work for UMIA to bill for the time they spent on his cases,
actual time, not "time that was made up." (R. at 185, Ex. G at 11). He expected to
pay for time they actually spent working, whether in the office or not. Id. He
could not recall ever before having discussed with defendant Williams any
9

concerns about Ferguson's representation of physician insureds for UMIA. Id. at
12. Neither had he ever had any complaints from his company's claims
department with respect to either the amount of time that Ferguson was billing, or
the way he was representing their clients. Id. at 12-13. Indeed, the trial court
initially found:

"There appears to be competent evidence in the record that there

were no complaints by UMIA of the plaintiff over-billing them." (R. 862-19 to 20). Ferguson testified that "the UMIA adjusters encourage us to spend the time
to do it right. So no, they've never — they've never even once suggested that I
was spending too much time defending their doctors."

(R. at 863-67).

No

complaints. (R. at 863-69 to -70).
Defendants

knew Ferguson

had developed

a substantial

business

relationship with UMIA and with its physician insureds while working at the law
firm. (R. at 32,ffif34, 35; 864-278). As of 2005, the year of his termination, 100
percent of Ferguson's work was for UMIA.

(R. at 863-69).

Defendants

knowingly defamed Ferguson to UMIA representatives by falsely informing them
he had been over-billing for his time to avoid Ferguson being allowed by UMIA to
take the medical malpractice files he was currently handling at the time of his
termination to another firm and continue handling the medical malpractice defense
on those cases, thereby "poisoning the well." (R. at 864-117). Defendants knew
that if Ferguson was simply terminated, that he would take his to-date billing,
current files, about 20 files (R. at 864-284), and future work away from the law
firm and transfer them to his new employer. Had UMIA not been falsely told by
10

defendants that Ferguson had over-billed for his time, Ferguson's client base
would likely have continued to include UMIA insured physicians and medical
malpractice defense. (R. at 185, Ex. G at 15-16, 24-25; Ex. B at 11, 33, 35-37; Ex.
Eat 111).
As a result of the meeting between Williams and Martin Oslowski, Mr.
Oslowski and UMIA made the decision not to assign new cases to Ferguson. (R.
at 864-258 to -259). Williams had anticipated that this would be the result. (R. at
864-259). As Mr. Oslowski later stated in his deposition, the reasons the files
stayed at the law firm, when Ferguson left was simple: "It was an issue of trust."
(R. at 185, Ex. G at 20-21). The law firm had told him that Ferguson had "overbilled" his company. (R. at 864-117, -258). The issue of trust was not what he
knew personally or what he had seen by way of evidence, rather, it was what he
had been told by defendant Williams. (R. at 185, Ex. G at 20).
Arthur Glenn, Vice President for Claims of UMIA, testified that he was
responsible for assigning cases to counsel as needed to represent UMLVs
physicians. (R. at 185, Ex. B at 4). When the law firm terminated Ferguson, he
called Mr. Glenn and informed him he had been accused by the law firm of overbilling UMIA. (R. at 864-283). Ferguson then asked Mr. Glenn specifically if
UMIA had ever had any complaint or problem with his billing, and Mr. Glenn told
Ferguson that he had not ever had any complaint or problem with his billing, (R. at
864-119), and testified to that same fact. (R. at 864-280, -283). Mr. Glenn had
reviewed Ferguson's bills against other bills submitted by attorneys at the law firm
ll

as part of the spot review he conducted every month, (R. at 185, Ex. B at 7-9;
864-280 to-281).
When Mr. Glenn reviewed the billing statements from the law firm for the
first five months of 2005, and he created a spreadsheet to review for evidence that
Ferguson had over-billed UMIA. (R. at 864-286). The spreadsheet created by Mr.
Glenn supported Ferguson. (R. at 185, Ex. I). Mr. Glenn knew Ferguson was
working on "several big cases" for UMIA. (R. at 185, Ex. B at 12). He also
indicated he would expect that a lawyer working on big, complex, medical
malpractice cases would have spent more time than another attorney working a
simpler file. Id.
The spreadsheet showed implicitly that Ferguson had not over-billed
UMIA. (R. at 185, Ex. I; 864-290). This spreadsheet showed, for example, that,
on a trip to Virginia Beach to take depositions, Ferguson billed an hour less for the
trip than did UMIA co-counsel representing another physician. It showed that Mr.
Ferguson had actually under-billed UMIA for his time. (R. at 185, Ex. B at 1718). It also showed an entry for 22 hours of billable time that had been incorrectly
logged as two-days' worth of time for one day entry. The time billed was correct,
but the billing date was incorrect, based on inaccuracies of the computer billing
system in place at the law firm. Id. at 18-19. When asked whether he had formed
an opinion as to whether UMIA had been over-billed for Ferguson's time, Mr.
Glenn testified that "I didn't find anything unusual in the billing that I would
consider overbilling." (R. at 185, Ex. B at 22). The billing program used by the
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law firm frequently recorded two days' worth of billable time on one day. (R. at
185, Ex. A at 78-80; Ex. D). For this reason, no one could rely on a day's entry of
time as the actual amount of time worked for any specific day by that attorney.
And, the trial court found that Ferguson "appears to be competent to offer
testimony regarding the inaccuracies of the computer time program there at the
firm." (R. at 862-19).
Mr. Glenn met with the lawyers from the law firm and told them his
findings, "nothing unusual," id, based on the spreadsheet. (R. at 864-291). The
lawyers at the meeting told Mr. Glenn that the basis for firing Ferguson was not
something Mr. Glenn would see on the bills, rather, they said they had a computer
program that they ran in their office, and it was based on the findings of log on and
log off times. (R. at 864-291). Defendants did not give Mr. Glenn the April 18,
2005 time records before their meeting. (R. at 864-304). Defendants told Mr.
Glenn that Ferguson had billed more hours that quarter than either Elliott Williams
or Bruce Jensen, and that he had over-billed UMIA for his work. (R. at 185, Ex. B
at 24; 864-292 to -293). The lawyers did not show Mr. Glenn any proof, not a
single paper, of evidence. (R. at 185, Ex. B at 25; 864-299 to -300, -304). When
Mr. Glenn asked the lawyers how much UMIA had been over-billed, and how
they would even know the amount, they told him defendant Williams "was
working with Marty on that, Mr. Oslowski,"

(R. at 185, Ex. B at 28). The

statement made by the lawyers to Mr. Glenn was false: Mr. Oslowski gave no
indication in his deposition that he was ever working on the amount with
13

defendant Williams, or that he had any involvement after his initial meeting with
the lawyers.

Mr. Oslowski stated that money was reimbursed to UMIA, an

"approximately a $10,000 credit" against a future bill. (R. at 185, Ex. G at 16).
When asked whether he had discussions with any other member of the law firm
about the matter, he testified that he had not, before Ferguson's termination, and
"may have afterwards just in passing." (R. at 185, Ex. G at 15-16).
Ferguson had a long-standing working relationship with Mr. Glenn, and
had done previous work for him in the early 1980's when he worked for Aetna.
(R. 863-57; 864-277). Mr. Glenn testified that Ferguson had asked him "if he'd
still be able to do work for UMIA after he left Williams and Hunt." (R. at 864283). But that would be Marty Oslowski's decision. (R. at 864-284). Mr. Glenn
further testified that the following day after his conversation with Ferguson, his
boss, Marty Oslowski called him and told him Ferguson "had been terminated forI think his words were "billing integrity," and to let my guys know that we weren't
to use him on any other cases," (R. at 185, Ex. B at 11), and "we weren't to assign
any more work to Gary." (R. at 864-284).
Trial lawyers do not normally limit billing time to only that time spent
using a computer in the office; nonetheless, this formed the foundation for
defendants' assertion that Ferguson over-billed UMIA. (R. at 185, Ex. E at 37-38;
864-169 to -170, -234).

Trial lawyers often work outside of the law office

attending depositions, meeting with witnesses and clients, including expert
witnesses, researching case law, doing medical research, and working on laptop
14

computers. (R. at 863-73 to -74, -92; 864-142). Ferguson often took work with
him outside of the office, and on a daily basis. (R. at 185, Ex. A at 74). Having
his desktop computer logged on or off had nothing to do with the actual amount of
time Ferguson put into defending a doctor and there were no log on/log off
requirements at the law firm. (R. at 863-74 to -76; 864-191 to -192). Ferguson's
billing recordation practices included using a handwritten calendar and using the
law firm's billing system template. (R. at 864-102 to -103).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Issue I:

The trial court misinterpreted and misapplied binding Utah

precedent and black letter defamation law in granting defendants' directed verdict
request. The trial court erroneously directed the verdict for the defendants
regarding the claims for defamation and intentional interference with economic
relations as pertaining to the UMIA because it applied a subjective standard based
on Alaska law, rather than the applicable Utah precedent, which required an
objective standard when determining that the defendants did not abuse their
claimed conditional privilege.
In Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49? 57 (Utah 1991), this Court
explained:
On appeal, the standard we use to review a directed verdict granted
at the close of evidence is whether reasonable minds would agree
that no substantial evidence supported each element of a cause of
action. Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass 'n
v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). To that
end, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party. If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence that would
15

support a verdict in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict
cannot stand. Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d at 898. But a directed
verdict is appropriate if, on uncontested facts and under the
applicable law, one party is entitled to judgment.
The trial court should have applied the binding precedent from O 'Connor v.
Burningham, 2007 UT 58, 165 P.3d 1214, and Wayment v. Clear Channel
Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25, 116 P.3d 271, which used the correct objective
Restatement standard, rather than the ML Juneau Enterprises, Inc. v. Juneau
Empire, 891 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1995) and DeNardo v. Bax, 147 P.3d 672 (Alaska
2006) cases, which applied an incorrect subjective standard.

This Court in

O'Connor properly stated:
Because the existence of defamatory content is a matter of law, a
reviewing court can, and must, conduct a context-driven assessment
of the alleged defamatory statement and reach an independent
conclusion about the statement's susceptibility to a defamatory
interpretation. This is not to say that the responsibility of
determining whether a statement is defamatory as a matter of law
falls to the reviewing court. In the first instance, it does not. Rather,
the reviewing court must answer the question of defamatory
susceptibility as a matter of law in a nondeferential manner.
2007 UT 58, K 26, 165 P.3d at 1222 (emphasis added). This Court stated the same
in Wayment:
Evidence of "malice" in this context may include indications that the
publisher "made [the statements] with ill will, [that the statements]
were excessively published, or [that the publisher] did not
reasonably believe his or her statements." Russell v. Thomson
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992); see also Combes
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 Utah 407, 228 P.2d 272, 275
(1951) (relying on authority requiring the employer to have " 'an
honest belief in the truth of the statement' " (quoting Harrison v.
Garrett, 132 N.C. 172, 43 S.E. 594, 596 (1903))); Hales v.
Commercial Bank, 114 Utah 186, 197 P.2d 910, 913 (1948) (" The
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publisher's lack of belief in the truth of the defamatory matter
published, or his lack of reasonable grounds for so believing, while
immaterial to the existence of the privileged occasion, is important
as constituting an abuse of the occasion which deprives him of the
protection which it would otherwise afford.' " (quoting Restatement
of Torts § 594 cmt. b (1938))).
2005 UT 25, If 53, 116 P.3d 271 (emphasis added).
In addition to misapplying the law, the trial court erred in directing the
verdict in this case due to the questions of fact involved: "Whether a statement is
entitled to the protection of a conditional privilege presents a question of law;
whether the holder of the privilege lost it due to abuse presents a question of fact."
O'Connor, 2007 UT 58, ^ 38, 165 P.3d at 1224 (citing Wayment v. Clear Channel
Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, ^ 53, 116 P.3d 271; Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58; Combes v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 Utah 407, 228 P.2d 272, 274-75 (1951)).
Questions of contested facts abounded at the close of Plaintiffs evidence that
showed the defendants abused the qualified or conditional privilege and the
defendants acted with malice based on an objective standard. Ferguson met his
burden at trial (and could have presented more evidence of malice were it not for
the trial court's motion in limine ruling precluding certain evidence also appealed
herein, see Issue IV, infra) showing that the privilege was abused by proving that
the defendants acted with malice and with reckless disregard as to the truth or
falsity of the over-billing allegations, and/or knowing the matter to be false.
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Issue II:

The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion for

summary judgment on plaintiffs

claim for intentional interference with

prospective economic relations regarding Siegfried & Jensen.
The trial court should have denied defendants' motion for summary
judgment. "In reviewing the [trial] court's grant of summary judgment, we review
the court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and review the
facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Young, 2008 UT App 104, ^ 7, 182 P.3d at 414; see Woodbury Amsource,
Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 28, \ 4, 73 P.3d 362 ("We review the district
court's summary judgment ruling for correctness, granting no deference to its legal
conclusions.").
Issue III:

The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion for

summary judgment on plaintiffs claims against defendant Frankenburg because
genuine issues of material fact and procedural deficiencies precluded such a
ruling. "In reviewing the [trial] court's grant of summary judgment, we review the
court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and review the facts
and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
Young, 2008 UT App 104, U 7, 182 P.3d at 414.
Issue IV: The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion in limine
precluding Plaintiff from offering any evidence of the fact that members of the
firm consumed alcohol in the office, of any alleged affair between firm employees,
of Plaintiffs surgical procedure scheduled for May 6, 2005, and of Plaintiffs
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brother's suicide, and should have allowed the evidence to show motive and
malice.

Plaintiff needed this evidence to meet his burden of proof to show

defendants abused the conditional privilege.

This Court reviews the trial court's

legal conclusions in a motion in limine for correctness. Ford v. Am. Express Fin.
Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, If 33, 98 P.3d 15, 24.
ARGUMENT
Important public policy reasons underlie speedy judicial determinations in
defamation actions, including matters such as witness memories fading and quick
redress of the defamation itself See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (providing
one year statute of limitations for libel and slander actions). The trial court's
summary judgment orders, motion in limine ruling, and directed verdict preempted
the jury's ability to determine justice in this matter.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPLIED
BINDING
UTAH
PRECEDENT
AND BLACK
LETTER
DEFAMATION LAW IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' DIRECTED
VERDICT REQUEST
This Court recently and explicitly addressed conditional privilege law in the

defamation context in the O'Connor case. 2007 UT 58, 165 P.3d 1214. The trial
court failed to follow this precedent in which this Court failed to find a high
school basketball coach a public figure, but found a familial conditional privilege
under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 597, which conditional privilege still
needed to be proven as a question of fact on remand, and explained:
It is important to note that our reference to the Parents in this context
is not limited to immediate family members of basketball team
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members, but also includes statements made by third parties so long
as the statements were published "within the generally accepted
standards of decent conduct" under the conditional privilege
described in section 595 and recognized by this court in Brehany.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 595(1 )(b); Brehany, 812 P.2d at
58. This standard does not shield defamatory statements that abuse
the conditional privilege, but it does protect those defendants who
are not immediate family members of women on the team. The
Parents may have abused and therefore lost this conditional privilege
as a refuge if, for example, they knew their statements regarding Mr.
O'Connor were false or acted with a reckless disregard as to their
falsity, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600, exceeded the
privilege's purpose in making their statements, see id. § 603, or
made statements to an individual or in a manner not reasonably
believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the privilege's
purpose, see id. §§ 604, 605, 605A. See also Hales v. Commercial
Bank, 114 Utah 186, 197 P.2d 910, 913 (1948) (" 'The publisher's
lack of belief in the truth of the defamatory matter published, or his
lack of reasonable grounds for so believing, while immaterial to the
existence of the privileged occasion, is important as constituting an
abuse of the occasion which deprives him of the protection which it
would otherwise afford.' " (quoting Restatement of Torts § 594 cmt.
b (1938))). Although we have not yet had occasion to formally adopt
all the potential means to abuse the privilege cited in the
Restatement, they all enjoy close ties to common sense and thus
appear worthy of our confidence.
O'Connor, 2007 UT, ^ 37, 165 P.3d at 1224 (emphasis added). An older, but
nonetheless applicable case, the Hales v. Commercial Bank, 197 P.2d 910 (1948)
decision, remains good law and the same renewed reasoning is found in this
Court's more recent decision Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005
UT 25, 116 P.3d 272 (Utah 2005).

Thus, analogously, the lamguage from the

Hales quote above, "lack of belief in the truth" mirrors section 600's "knows the
matter to be false" language while "lack of reasonable grounds for so believing"
mirrors sections 600's "acts in reckless disregard" language. These are objective
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tests. The trial court should not have dismissed the O'Connor/Hales precedent in
favor of Alaska precedent.

(R. 864-333 to -335).

Based on this Court's

confidence in the Restatement conditional privilege provisions, analysis of each
section applicable to this case highlights the trial court's error in granting the
directed verdict in this case.
A.

The Trial Court Erroneously Interpreted Restatement (Second)
of Torts Principles Inherent in and Consistent with Utah Law

The applicable Restatement (Second) of Torts sections include:
§ 593. Elements Of Conditional Privilege Arising From Occasion
One who publishes defamatory matter concerning another is not
liable for the publication if
(a) the matter is published upon an occasion that makes it
conditionally privileged and
(b) the privilege is not abused.1
Comment:
a. The rules describing occasions that give rise to a conditional
privilege are stated in §§ 594 to 598A. The rules governing the
exercise of a conditional privilege arising from the occasion are
stated in §§599 to 605A.
b. The privilege to publish defamatory matter that arises out of a
conditionally privileged occasion is not personal to those who
publish it for the purposes indicated in §§ 594-598A inclusive. It is
available also to those to whom those persons give authority to
publish defamatory matter on their behalf, if the authorization is a
reasonable means of accomplishing the purpose of the privilege.
Thus a newspaper publisher is privileged to publish an obviously

1

This is a question of fact, O'Connor, 2007 UT 58, ^ 38, 165 P.3d at 1224, and in

the present case the Statement of Facts shows that Plaintiff met his burden to show
the abuses.
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defamatory advertisement if the person inserting it is conditionally
privileged to publish the defamatory matter contained in it and
publication in the newspaper is a reasonable method of giving it the
publicity necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the
privilege is given. (See § 612).
c. Relation of privilege to constitutional requirement of fault as to
falsity. A conditional privilege is one of the methods utilized by the
common law for balancing the interest of the defamed person in the
protection of his reputation against the interests of the publisher, of
third persons and of the public in having the publication take place.
The latter interests are not strong enough under the circumstances to
create an absolute privilege but they are of sufficient significance to
relax the usual standard for liability. Thus the traditional balance at
common law had been attained in the past by holding that a person
having a conditional privilege was not subject to the normal strict
liability for a defamatory communication but was liable only if he
did not believe the statement to be true or lacked reasonable grounds
for so believing. This adjustment of the conflicting interests has now
been subjected to necessary modification by the recent holding of
the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
(1972) 418 U.S. 323, that strict liability in defamation is
unconstitutional and that a publisher can be held liable only if he
was at fault amounting at least to negligence regarding the falsity of
the statement. (See § 580B).
One consequence of this holding is that mere negligence as to
falsity., being required for all actions of defamation, is no longer
treated as sufficient to constitute abuse of a conditional privilege.
Instead, knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity is necessary for
this purpose. (See § 600). For explanation of this in more detail, see
the Special Note to Topic 3, immediately preceding § 593; and see §
580B, Comment 1.
Another significant consequence of all this is that the courts will
now find it necessary to reassess the circumstances under which it is
appropriate to grant a conditional privilege. If a proper adjustment of
the conflicting interests of the parties indicates that a publisher
should be held liable for failure to use due care to determine the truth
of the communication before publishing it, a conditional privilege is
not needed and should not now be held to apply. The conditional
privilege should be confined to a situation where the court feels that
it is appropriate to hold the publisher liable only in case he knew of
the falsity or acted in reckless disregard of it. This should be borne
in mind in contemplating each of the sections on conditional
privilege.
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§ 594. Protection Of The Publisher's Interest
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief2 that
(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important interest
of the publisher, and
(b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of
service in the lawful protection of the interest.

§ 595. Protection Of Interest Of Recipient Or A Third Person
(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief3 that
(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important interest
of the recipient or a third person, and
(b) the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal duty4
to publish the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its

2

Defendants testified in ways that wholly belied any "correct or reasonable belief

that Ferguson was over-billing UMIA. See Statement of Facts; (R. at 864-191, 206 to -207, -224 to -225, -233 to -234, -240, -258 to -259).
3

Accord O'Connor, 2007 UT 58, 165 P.3d 1214; Wayment, 2005 UT 25, 116P.3d

271; Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3. Privileged publication or broadcast defined:
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall not be considered
as libelous or slanderous per se, is one made:
* * * *

(3) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested
therein, by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in such
relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for
supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or who is
requested by the person interested to give the information.
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publication is otherwise within the generally accepted standards of
decent conduct.5
(2) In determining whether a publication is within generally accepted
standards of decent conduct it is an important factor that
(a) the publication is made in response to a request6 rather than
volunteered by the publisher or
(b) a family or other relationship exists between the parties.

§ 596. Common Interest
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances lead any one of several persons having a common
interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to
believe7 that there is information that another sharing the common
interest is entitled to know.

4

As further evidence of the malice engaged in by making the defamatory

statements at issue in this case selectively to only UMIA, Ferguson's main client,
no one at the law firm fulfilled their ethical or legal duty to report the over-billing
to the Utah State Bar. (R. at 864-259 to -261).
5

See, e.g., Issue IV, infra, regarding the law firm's false conflict reporting to

Ferguson's new law firm and calculated timing in firing him the day before his
surgery.
6

UMIA made no such request, indeed, Mr. Glenn had no concerns about

Ferguson's preparation for depositions, (R. at 864-303), or billing. (R. at 864280).
7

Defendants admitted in trial testimony that the computer log on/log off records

were not sufficient in and of themselves to correctly or reasonably form the belief
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§ 599. General Principle
One who publishes defamatory matter concerning another upon an
occasion giving rise to a conditional privilege is subject to liability to
the other if he abuses the privilege.
Comment:
a. The privileges described in §§ 594-598A are conditional ones, that
is, the protection that they give is conditioned upon the manner in
which the privilege is exercised. The unreasonable exercise of the
privilege is an abuse of it that defeats the protection otherwise
afforded. The privilege may be abused because of the publisher's
knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of the defamatory
matter (see §§ 600-602); because the defamatory matter is published
for some purpose other than that for which the particular privilege is
given (see § 603); because the publication is made to some person
not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose of the particular privilege (see § 604); or because the
publication includes defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the occasion is
privileged. (See §§ 605, 605A).

that Ferguson was over-billing UMIA, (R. at 185, Ex. E at 37-38; 864-169 to -170,
-234), defendants did not provide the Timekeeper information (Defendants' Trial
Ex. No. 3) to Mr. Glenn to have the opportunity to analyze even though it was
created on April 18, 2005 — before the May 20, 2005 meeting, (R. at 864-304),
and particularly in light of Mr. Glenn's spreadsheet exhibiting no apparent billing
abuses, (R. at 185, Ex. I), and the realities and practicalities of modem law
practice occurring outside the office and on computers other than solely the
lawyer's desktop computer.
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§ 600. Knowledge Of Falsity Or Reckless Disregard As To Truth
Except as stated in § 602, one who upon an occasion giving rise to a
conditional privilege publishes false and defamatory matter
concerning another abuses the privilege if he
(a) knows the matter to be false, or
(b) acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.
Comment:
a. The traditional common law system of a set of conditional
privileges with possible loss of the privilege through its abuse, as set
forth in §§ 593-605A, involves a process of balancing competing
interests in accordance with the facts. The traditional balance at
common law had been attained in the past by holding that a person
having a conditional privilege was not subject to the normal strict
liability for a defamatory communication but was liable only if he
did not believe the statement to be true or lacked reasonable grounds
for so believing.
This adjustment of the conflicting interests has now been subjected
to necessary modification by the recent holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., (1974) 418 U.S. 323,
that strict liability in defamation is unconstitutional and that a
publisher can be held liable only if he was at least negligent
regarding the falsity of the statement. (See § 580B). This holding has
affected particularly the provisions of this Section.
b. One consequence of the holding is that mere negligence as to
falsity, being required for all actions of defamation, is no longer
treated as sufficient to amount to abuse of a conditional privilege.
Instead, knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity is necessary for
this purpose. The policy upon which the conditional privilege is
based then no longer applies, and except as stated in § 602, the
publisher is not given the protection that the privilege will otherwise
afford, if the matter turns out to be false. (See the Special Note to
Topic 3, immediately preceding § 593; and see §§ 599, Comment d,
and 580B, Comment 1.)
Reckless disregard as to truth or falsity exists when there is a high
degree of awareness of probable falsity or serious doubt as to the
truth of the statement.8 The standard here is the same whether

Believing that a lawyer's desktop computer log on and log off times adequately
reflect detailed billing and form the sole basis for documenting billings proves
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liability will be imposed for a defamatory communication about a
public official or a public figure. (See § 580A5 especially Comment
d).
c. This Section applies to the privileges set forth in §§ 594-598A. As
indicated in § 599, Comment c, the provisions of §§ 600-605A do
not apply to the privileges expressed in §§ 611 and 612.
d. If the defamatory matter turns out to be true, the publisher has a
complete defense under the rule stated in § 581 A, even though he
believed it to be false or acted in reckless disregard as to its truth or
falsity.
B.

The Trial Court Erroneously Relied on the ML Juneau and
DeNardo Alaska Defamation Cases, Because Utah and Alaska
Define and Analyze Malice in the Conditional Privilege Context
Differently

The trial court's reliance on Mount Juneau Enterprises, Inc. v. Juneau
Empire, an Alaska Supreme Court decision, to order a directed verdict in this case
was misplaced and wrong. 891 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1995). The Alaska case is not
on point for two critical reasons: (1) it was a public figure defamation case,
whereas the present case involves a private individual defamation case and (2) the
actual malice standard applied in Mount Juneau is distinct from the conditional
privilege malice inquiry required under Utah law, and the trial court should have
applied binding precedent from this Court to determine that defendants had
forfeited their conditional privilege, or at least that factual issues existed regarding
abuse of the conditional privilege.
Mount Juneau addressed defamation in the context of a public figure

highly probable to be wrong and therefore in reckless disregard of the realities
inherent in lawyers' practices. (R. at 185, Ex. E at 37-38; 864-169 to -170, -234).
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involved in a public concern. 891 P.2d at 829. In Mount Juneau the plaintiffs,
who sought to build a tram from downtown Juneau to the top of Mount Juneau,
brought a libel action against Juneau Empire, a newspaper, for two articles written
about the plaintiffs and their business. Id. at 833-34. The plaintiffs claimed that
the "newspaper acted with malice and negligence in publishing" the articles,
which contained some inaccuracies about financial difficulties and hazardous
substance found on the plaintiffs' property. Id. at 834. To begin, the court
discussed the applicability of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) actual malice standard. Id. The court found that the actual malice standard
applied because Charles Keen, the president of Alaska Trams, was a public figure;
he "voluntarily sought public approval of the ambitious tramway project." Id. at
837. The court continued by stating that even if Keen was not a public figure, the
actual malice standard was applicable because Alaska courts apply the actual
malice standard to defamation cases regarding issues of public concern and
interest. Id. The court found that at least one of the newspaper articles contained
"matters of public interest;" as the article scrutinized the affects of hazardous
substances located on the proposed tramway property. Id. at 838. Therefore, the
court applied the New York Times actual malice standard, which "focuses on the
defendant's subjective intent."

Id.

Because the court found the plaintiffs

presented no evidence of actual malice, the defendant was not liable for
defamation and summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed. Id. at 841.
The holding, however, hinged on the fact that Keen was a public figure and the
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tramway was a public concern.
Because the present case does not involve public figure or public concern
issues, it clearly differs from Mount Juneau. Thus, the New York Times actual
malice standard is not applicable.

Id. at 835.

The Alaska Supreme Court

recognized that there are different standards that apply when dealing with public
figures and private individuals. The court stated: "if the defamation plaintiff is a
private individual, then states may apply their own standard of liability [instead of
the New York Times actual malice standard] so long as they do not impose liability
without fault." Id. Thus, because the present case presents a private individual
suing for defamation regarding a private issue, the trial court should have applied
Utah state defamation law.
The two distinct malice standards distinguish this case from Mount Juneau.
See Brehany, 812 P.2d at 59 ("Although the common law term and the New York
Times term use the same words, they denote different legal concepts."). In Mount
Juneau the New York Times actual malice standard was applied to determine fault.
891 P.2d at 838. In the present case, however, the trial court should have applied
common law malice to determine if the conditional privilege, which shields
liability, had been abused and forfeited.

This Court, in Wayment, clarified the

distinction between the two malice standards applied in defamation cases: "While
'[ajctual malice refers to the constitutionally mandated level of fault necessary in
public figure cases,' malice in the context of a conditional privilege 'is simply a
means of determining when the privilege . . . is forfeited."' 2005 UT 25, ^J 53, 116
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P.3d at 288 n.19 (citing Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 904
(Utah 1992)). This Court elaborated:
proof of knowledge of or reckless disregard for a statement's falsity
would satisfy either standard. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §
600 (1977) (providing that knowledge of or reckless disregard for a
statement's falsity constitutes an abuse of a conditional privilege).
While in the public figure context, such proof demonstrates the
required level of fault, the same proof serves in the privilege context
to demonstrate the publisher's "hostility or ill will," Brehany, 812
P.2d at 59.
Id. The facts in this case showed hostility or ill will sufficient to forfeit any
privilege.
The New York Times actual malice standard is narrow and cannot be
substituted for common law malice when analyzing a conditional privilege. The
Alaska Supreme Court explained that to recover damages in a public figure
defamation case, a plaintiff must prove that the statements at issue were with made
actual malice, meaning "with knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless
disregard of whether [they were] false or not." Mount Juneau, 891 P.2d at 834-35.
On the other hand, this Court defined malice, with regard to a conditional privilege
inquiry, to mean statements made with "ill will," statements that were
"excessively published," or statements where the speaker "did not reasonably
believe his or her statements." Wayment, 116 P.3d at 288. Comparison of the
definitions demonstrates that proof of actual malice always fulfills common law
malice, but proof of common law malice does not always fulfill actual malice. Id.
at 288 n.19. Proof that a speaker did not reasonably believe his statements to be
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true is an easier standard to satisfy than the requirement of knowledge or reckless
disregard of falsity to satisfy the actual malice standard. This Court left no room
for speculation — malice in regard to conditional privilege and actual malice in
regard public officials or public figures are two distinct terms that courts should
not use interchangeably. See Brehany, 812 P. 2d at 59; Wayment, 116P.3dat288.
Under this binding Utah precedent, the defendants forfeited their
conditional privilege.

A conditional privilege, which shields liability from

defamation, extends to "employer's communication to employees and to other
interested parties concerning the reasons for an employee's discharge." Brehany,
812 P.2d at 58. If, however, a plaintiff can demonstrate the statements were made
with malice or there was an abuse of the privilege, the speaker forfeits the
privilege. See id. at 59; O'Connor, 2007 UT 58, <{ 37, 165 P.3d at 1224; Wayment,
2005 UT 25, U 53, 116 P.3d at 288. As discussed earlier in this brief, the
O 'Connor case embraced the Restatement concept that an abuse of a conditional
privilege forfeits the liability shield. 2007 UT 58, Tf 37, 165 P.3d at 1224. Abuse
of a conditional privilege includes: knowing a statement is false, acting with
reckless disregard as to the statement's falsity, exceeding the privilege's purpose
in making the statement, or making "statements to an individual or in a manner not
reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the privilege's
purpose." Id. And, in Utah, whether a conditional privilege exists is a question of
law, but forfeiture of the privilege is one of fact. Id. 2007 UT 58, U 38, 165 P.3d at
1224; WaymenU 2005 UT 25,ffi[53-54, 116 P.3d at 288. The existence of malice
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or abuse forfeits the conditional privilege, placing liability for the defamatory
statements on the speaker, here defendants/appellees.
Undisputedly, the present case presents a conditional privilege situation.
The communication to UMIA about Ferguson allegedly over-billing and the law
firm firing him for this reason fits into the Court's definition — UMIA, who was
allegedly being over-billed by Ferguson, was an interested party regarding his
termination.

What remains disputed, however, is whether the privilege was

forfeited by the defendants' malice or by an abuse of the privilege.
The defendants did forfeit their privilege by acting with malice. Under
Utah case law and the Restatement, as already noted, malice occurs when a
statement is made with ill will or when the speaker did not reasonably believe his
statements. The facts demonstrate not only that the defendants had no reasonable
belief that their statements to UMIA were true, but also acted with ill will towards
Ferguson.
The Wayment case further illustrated the necessary level of malice or
sufficient evidence of malice required to overturn a summary judgment ruling,
which was based on the presence of a conditional privilege.

In that case a

television reporter, Holly Wayment, wanted to start a foundation to help children
with cancer. Id. 2005 UT 25, TJ10, 116 P.3d at 276. Wayment approached an area
health care provider to get monetary support for the foundation.

Id.

Her

supervisor, however, thought the funding was a conflict of interest, since the news
channel occasionally covered the provider's activities, and Wayment was then told
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she would be fired, unless she resigned, because of the conflict. Id. 2005 UT 25,
ffll 9, 11, 116 P.3d at 276-77. Shortly after resigning, Wayment brought suit for
defamation regarding false statements concerning her termination. Id. Wayment
claimed that Fischer and Benedict had falsely reported to others that she had been
terminated because she had taken money from the health care provider, had used
her reporter status to set up the foundation, and was "in bed" with the provider.
Id. The only admissible evidence offered by the Plaintiff was Wayment's own
account of events and one witness's deposition testimony about statements
Benedict said to him. Id. 2005 UT 25, ffif 51-52, 116 P.3d at 287-88. The
Wayment court, however, found the record contained "sufficient evidence to raise
a genuine issue of fact regarding whether [the speaker] reasonably believed the
truth of his communication." Id. 2005 UT 25, ^ 54, 116 P.3d at 288. The court
rejected the conditional privilege asserted by the defendants and remanded to the
district court to determine the issue of malice. Id. 2005 UT 25, ^ 56, 116 P.3d at
289.
The present case encompasses an evidentiary situation more compelling
than that in Wayment. By the standard set in Wayment, Ferguson offers more than
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the
defendants acted with malice. The defendants' assertion of over-billing relied
unreasonably on time Ferguson was logged onto his office computer.

It is

common and an accepted practice, however, that medical malpractice attorneys are
required to work many hours away from the office — taking depositions, meeting
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with clients or experts, performing medical research and investigation, etc. (R. at
863-73 to -74, -92; 864-142). Also Ferguson presented evidence of inaccuracies
in the computer billing system that the defendants nevertheless relied upon for
their allegations of over-billing. (R. at 862-19). Ferguson even had evidence from
Mr. Glenn, UMIA's claims manager, confirming that Ferguson had not over-billed
UMIA. (R. at 185, Ex. I).
The defendants also acted with ill will towards Ferguson The defendants
knowingly fired Ferguson the day before he was to have a suspected cancerous
thyroid removed, terminating Ferguson's disability policy, and stranding him
without disability insurance if anything went amiss during surgery. (R. at 7, T| 40).
The evidence shows that the defendants acted with malice; under the
circumstances they could not have reasonably believed their statements that
Ferguson over-billed UMIA and his termination was accompanied by ill will. And
the abovementioned is only the egregious evidence showing malice, there are
many other examples. In Wayment this Court overturned a summary judgment
concerning a similar employment issue, in analyzing malice with respect to a
conditional privilege, based on fewer facts and less compelling evidence.
Following binding Utah precedent clearly presents a reasonable basis in the
evidence that would support a verdict in favor of Ferguson and the directed verdict
should not stand.
The trial court also incorrectly relied on the Alaska Supreme Court's
analysis in DeNardo v. Bax, which addressed conditionally privileged defamatory
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statements and when such privileges are waived. 147 P.3d 672 (Alaska 2006). In
that case, DeNardo accused a former co-worker, Joy Bax, of defamation because
she informed other co-workers that she thought DeNardo might be stalking her.
Id. at 675. The court recognized that a privilege existed for Bax's statement to her
co-workers, as a "sufficiently important interest . . . [was] at stake," namely her
and her co-workers' safety. Id. at 678-79. The court further explained that malice
was one manner in which a person could waive a privilege and be liable for their
statements. Id. at 679. The Alaska court's definition of malice mirrored the New
York Times actual malice standard; it defined malice to be when a "publisher had
knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of the defamatory matter." Id.
The court continued by stating "the actual malice test for determining abuse of a
conditional privilege is subjective, at the summary judgment stage the court must
determine 'whether there is a genuine issue of material fact on whether [the
defendant] entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statements.'" Id. at 680
(citing Mount Juneau Enters., Inc. v. Juneau Empire, 891 P.2d 829, 834 (Alaska
1995) (emphasis added)). The court, however, determined that DeNardo failed to
present evidence demonstrating that Bax "entertained serious doubts" about the
truth of her statements. DeNardo, 147 P.3d at 680. As a result, the court found no
malice in Bax's statement, and, thus upheld the privilege. Id.
The trial court's reliance on DeNardo to uphold the conditional privilege
here was misplaced, because the Alaska malice test, outlined in DeNardo, and the
Utah malice test differ.

In DeNardo the Alaska Supreme Court limited its
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definition of malice to knowledge and reckless disregard for falsity.

DeNardo,

147 P.3d at 679. This Court, in Wayment, however, importantly included in its
malice definition statements where the speaker "did not reasonably believe his or
her statements." 2005 UT 25, ^ 53, 116 P.3d at 288. Although Wayment does not
define reasonable belief, Black's Law Dictionary states that it "denote[s] the fact
that the actor believes that a given fact or combination of facts exist, and that the
circumstances which he knows, or should know, are such as to cause a reasonable
man so to believe." Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, whether a
person reasonably believes his statement is not a pure subjective test, there is both
a subjective and objective component to the test.

Utah case law, therefore,

demands that the speaker's knowledge (subjective component) and the
circumstances surrounding a statement (objective component) be examined to
determine if the statement was not reasonably believed, or in other words made
with malice.

This is different from the DeNardo court's characterization of

malice, which that court specified was only a subjective test. DeNardo, 147 P.3d
at 680.

The two standards differ substantially:

Alaska case law requires a

subjective inquiry into whether the speaker had "serious doubts" as to the truth of
the matter, whereas Utah case law requires both a subjective and objective inquiry
into whether the speaker did not have a "reasonable belief that the statement was
true.

In light of Wayment, which is binding Utah precedent, the trial court

erroneously relied on the DeNardo malice test to grant a directed verdict based on
conditional privilege in the present case.
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Based on Utah precedent and Restatement black letter law, the trial court
should not have granted defendants' directed verdict request with the evidence
presented by the Plaintiff that defendants abused any available conditional
privilege. The jury should have had the opportunity to weigh the evidence.
A jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial
evidence, where the reasonable inferences themselves are more than speculation
and conjecture.

Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).

The line

between "reasonable inferences" and mere speculation escapes precise definition;
however, the Third Circuit has effectively described the process of distinguishing
between reasonable inferences and impermissible speculation:
The line between a reasonable inference that may permissibly be
drawn by a jury from basic facts in evidence and an impermissible
speculation is not drawn by judicial idiosyncrasies. The line is drawn
by the laws of logic. If there is an experience of logical probability
that an ultimate fact will follow a stated narrative or historical fact,
then the jury is given the opportunity to draw a conclusion because
there is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the
proven facts. As the Supreme Court has stated, "the essential
requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for
probative facts after making due allowance for all reasonably
possible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked."
Tose v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 895 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S.
893 (1981) (quoting Galloway, 319 U.S. at 395)). Logically, a computer program
that only logs on and off times for only a lawyer's desktop computer does not
permit the reasonable inference that times billed in excess of the in-office
computer use are improper. Indeed, the inference and evidence is that logging on
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or off had nothing to do with the law firm until it decided to cover its tracks and
attempted to justify its termination and defamation of Ferguson.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
FOR INTENTIONAL
INTERFERENCE
WITH
BUSINESS
RELATIONS
To establish intentional interference with economic relations, a Plaintiff

must prove (1) that defendant intentionally interfered with the Plcdntiffs existing or
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means;
and (3) damages. Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304
(Utah 1982). Courts look at the predominant purpose underlying the defendant's
conduct. Id. at 307 n.9. Improper purpose exists when the actor's predominant
purpose is spite or ill will. Id. The improper means test requires that the means
used to interfere are contrary to law. Id. Defamation is specifically listed as an
improper means.

Id.

"To satisfy the alternative of improper purpose, the

defendant's purpose to injure the plaintiff

must predominate over all other

purposes, including the long-range purpose of achieving some personal economic
gain." Id. at 312.
Defendants knew, and admitted, Ferguson had built a business relationship
with UMIA and its physician insureds. (R. at 864-278). Defendants knew that
UMIA was his (and their) chief source of physician clients, and thereby, revenues.
(R. at 185, Ex. E at 13; 863-69). At best, there exists a factual dispute over
whether they acted knowingly to destroy Ferguson's reputation with UMIA for
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defendants' own purposes. Defendants told UMIA that Ferguson had over-billed
for an improper purpose; their actions were motivated out of spite and ill will
towards him stating to UMIA that they had "lost confidence in him" and "there
were trust issues." (R. at 185, Ex. E at 111). Defendants used an improper means
— defaming Ferguson's professional reputation — so that UMIA would keep its
files with the law firm. {Id. at 864-259). Ferguson has suffered substantial and
obvious damage with his major client gone, (R. at 863-69), and has been required
to change his entire practice as a result of defendants' tortious conduct. Ferguson
immediately realized this: "EJW poisoned the well with UMIA." (R. at 864-117).
Indeed, he had, the day before Ferguson's termination, and neither defendant Hunt
nor defendant Williams denies it. Williams met with Martin Oslowski and the
UMIA files that had been previously assigned to Ferguson remained at the law
firm after his termination. (R. at 864-259).
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT
FRANKENBURG BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT AND PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDED SUCH A
RULING
Plaintiffs claims relating to defendant Frankenburg were highlighted in the

defendants' motion for reconsideration of summary judgment, (R. at 470-479), for
the first time and argued at the January 1, 2008 hearing. (R. at 857-4 to -5, -8 to 11). This issue was not properly raised below, and was outside the scheduling
order, so there was nothing to reconsider. Ferguson alleged in his complaint that
all of the defendants, including Frankenburg, acted together, with knowledge of
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the falsity of their accusations, and with knowledge that defendant Williams,
Frankenburg's partner, was defaming Ferguson as a way of getting him out of the
firm, and destroying his ability to compete with the firm forever.

These

allegations were evidenced in the depositions and affidavits provided on summary
judgment, including the Affidavit of Gary Ferguson.

(R. at 185, Ex. C).

Frankenburg's time to object to the plan that Elliot Williams devised, has passed
before the motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment in which this
claim was not first raised, and defendant Frankenburg thereby waived his right to
challenge the claims against him, and the trial court should not have granted
summary judgment in his favor.
Defendant Frankenburg is a principal in, and an employee of, the law firm,
and was sued in that capacity as well as in his individual capacity. (R. at 2, ^ 8).
On or around May 12, 2005, UMIA representatives met with Jensen at the law
firm's offices and gave the files for the cases Ferguson had been handling, to
attorneys Carolyn Jensen and Kurt Frankenburg, both employees and shareholders
at the law firm. (R. at 8, ^ 49;).
Ferguson then secured a position as a plaintiffs personal injury lawyer with
a Salt Lake City law firm, Siegfried & Jensen. The position does not pay a current
salary, nor does it provide the same benefits he had been entitled to as an
employee and shareholder of the firm. (R. at 11, ^ 64). Defendants Hunt and
Frankenburg thereafter contacted Siegfried & Jensen representatives and falsely
advised them that Ferguson had conflicts in any Siegfried & Jensen case in which
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the law firm represented a party. (R. at 185, Ex. E at 114). The representatives
indicated that the law firm would move to disqualify Siegfried & Jensen on each
such case if it hired Ferguson.

(R. at 11, ^f 65).

At the time of their

representations, Hunt and Frankenburg knew such representations were false.
Cases within the law firm were not the subject of firm-wide meetings, and
Ferguson had only one potential conflict with any case at the firm. That conflict
case ("the Pack case") was known to all the parties concerned, and it was agreed
by Ferguson and Siegfried & Jensen the case would be referred to other counsel so
there would be no conflict. Ferguson had no personal knowledge of any of the
other cases such that he would have been disqualified, and thereby Siegfried &
Jensen disqualified from representation. (R. at 11-12, ^f 66). Defendants knew
that no such conflict existed, but knowingly, intentionally, and falsely insisted
otherwise, thereby attempting to further deprive Ferguson of a prospective
business opportunity. (R. at 12, ^f 67).
Ferguson was thereafter forced to hire counsel to act on his behalf with
respect to the law firm's assertions that he had a conflict that prevented him from
working for Siegfried & Jensen. His attorney made inquiry into the situation and
provided Ferguson with advice and counsel. (R. at 12, 1f 68). The law firm
thereafter withdrew its objection to Ferguson's employment with Siegfried &
Jensen, conceding that no real or imagined conflict existed to prevent such
employment. (R. at 12, ^ 69).
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS5
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MOTION IN LIMINE ON FOUR ISSUES BECAUSE EACH
DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE COMMON LAW MALICE
INQUIRY AND WERE PROPER EVIDENCE
The trial court granted defendants' motion in limine to preclude testimony
about four issues, including members of the law firm's drinking practices at their
firm location, the claimed allegation of affairs between employers and employees,
Ferguson's medical procedure, and Ferguson's brother's suicide. (R. at 857-28).
The trial court found this evidence irrelevant, "irrespective of how this Court ruled
on the motion for reconsideration. They do not meet our statutory defi — our rule
definition for relevance." (R. at 857-28 to -29).

The judge further found this

evidence to have "zero relevance" and that prejudice outweighed any probative
value. (R. at 857-29). However, this evidence was relevant to show common law
malice.
The trial court should have allowed this evidence to further illustrate the
atmosphere within which the defamation occurred.

This evidence also was

relevant to timing and to context. Each of these pieces of evidence would have
gone to establish the ill will and malice against Ferguson that ultimately lead to the
defamatory statements made about him to UMIA. The point and relevancy of the
evidence goes to support the Utah common law malice standard. Each of these
pieces of evidence, when added to the other evidence and circumstances
elaborated in the facts of this case, including the lack of investigation and the
manner in which the termination occurred, proves probative of the common law
malice question under Utah and Restatement principles.
42

The precluded evidence would have provided information relating to the
foundation and motivation for defendants' conduct toward Ferguson.

This

foundation relating to Ferguson's unpopular requests that members of the law firm
stop ingesting so much alcohol during work hours and that the law firm follow up
with a sexual harassment policy when an extra-marital affair was taking place
helps define the contours of the malice required to defeat any conditional
privilege. These items, while clearly prejudicial to defendants, are not unfairly
prejudicial given the context of the allegations that were made against Ferguson.
The defendants did not parse words when they called Ferguson a cheat, a liar, and
a thief. And when a highly visible lawyer is accused of over-billing; liar, cheat
and thief are the operative destructive terms for any self-respecting and honest
lawyer. Honesty and integrity are the tools of a lawyer's trade, especially a lawyer
who has earned the trust of the most important and more prominent medical
malpractice insurance company in the State of Utah.
Considering the over-billing statements made by the defendants, Ferguson
should have been able to introduce evidence to prove the context necessary to
meet his burden of proof discussed more folly in Issue I, supra, and why his
former partners would behave in such a manner. Any unfair prejudice that may
result would not substantially outweigh the value of evidence of malice, motive,
and plan. Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Indeed, such evidence was also important for
cross-examination purposes, and to test the credibility of the defendant party
witnesses.

This is an important part of a plaintiffs case and should not be
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disturbed by Rule 403. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987). Motivation
and bias are crucial items in cases involving claims of conduct involving malice,
which is why this kind of evidence is generally allowed in criminal cases. See
State v. Paterson, 656 P.2d 438 (Utah 1982).
Evidence of Ferguson's medical procedures was relevant both to his
damages (as he was very apprehensive about his upcoming surgery and his
partners knew it), and also probative of the defendants' malice when they would
choose to terminate him on a day when he would be at his most vulnerable, and
more likely to be unable to fully defend himself and consider his options.
Ferguson's surgery was scheduled for May 6, 2005, the day following the date on
which he was fired, and when Williams and Hunt fired Ferguson they did so fully
knowing that the next day he was scheduled to have surgery. (R. at 7,ffl[40, 41).
Finally, the fact that Ferguson's brother committed suicide is relevant in the
context that his partners also knew of this fact, and they knew that Gary's brother
committed suicide in relation to being terminated from his employment. Like the
planned defamation, the fact that the law firm did this at a time when Ferguson
was personally struggling emotionally was no mistake.
CONCLUSION
The trial court, through summary judgment, motion in limine ruling, and
directed verdict upon close of Plaintiff s evidence disregarded the genuine issues
of material fact and the reasonable bases in the evidence that would support a
verdict in Ferguson's favor. The trial court failed to apply Utah law as enunciated
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by this Court. As support for its directed verdict, the trial court cited opinions
from this Court, which prove integral to the defamation issues central to this case,
yet the trial court ignored the applicable Utah precedent and Restatement black
letter law and, then incorrectly applied Alaska law.

As in this case, when

defendants abuse a conditional privilege, this therefore exposes them to liability
for defamation.
For all the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's summary judgment order, motion in limine ruling, and
directed verdict and remand this case for trial.

DATED this 15th day of July 2008.
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